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II. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal of a Final Judgment and Order of the Third 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dated June 7, 
1994 granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k). 
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III. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether Plaintiff established "actual knowledge" under 
Title 75-7-406 U.C.A. on the part of Defendant or its agents and 
whether it was necessary to establish actual knowledge in this 
case. 
2. Whether Plaintiff has standing. 
3. Whether Plaintiff's claims are barred by applicable 
Statutes of Limitation. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Each of the three issues presented for review poses a question 
of law and was determined by summary judgment. Consequently, all 
three issues have the same standard of review. 
A summary judgment may be affirmed only when "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Baumgart v. Utah Farm 
Bureau Ins. Co.. 851 P.2d 647, 651 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(e)). In reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate 
court must "construe all facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in a light most favorable to the losing party, and review 
independently issues of law." Baumgart, at 651; See also: Ron 
Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 
1989). 
In determining whether the trial court properly granted 
judgment as a matter of law, the appellate court must "give no 
deference to the trial court's view of the law; [and] review it for 
2 
correctness." Id, at 1385; See also: Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 
403, 404 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted); and Bonham v. 
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). A challenge to summary judgment 
"presents for review conclusions of law only, because, by 
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues . . ." 
Morganf at 499. Consequently, said conclusions are reviewed "for 
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions." Id, (citing Madsen v. Borthick, 97 Utah Adv. Rep 
(1988). "That same lack of deference applies to the trial court's 
interpretation of statutes, which likewise poses a question of 
law." Id, (citing Asay v. Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988) • 
3 
IV. 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
The determinative rules in this case are as follows: 
Rule 56(b) and (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor as 
to all or any part thereof. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. 
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal 
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible 
in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is 
competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or 
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in 
an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. 
The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed 
by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary 
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
A party waives all defenses and objections which he does not 
present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he 
has made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that 
the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can 
be granted, the defense of failure to join an indispensable 
party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense 
to a claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is 
permitted, or by motion for judgment on the pleadings or at 
the trial on the merits, and except (2) that whenever it 
appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the 
court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action. The objection or defense, if made 
at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) 
in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
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V. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. This action was filed in the Third District Court of Salt 
Lake County/ State of Utah by Anna Lee Anderson as Plaintiff on the 
6th day of December, 1990. Plaintiff sought damages against 
defendants for breach of contract, tortious interference with 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. (Rec. 1-12). 
2. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint 
on the 15th day of April, 1991 pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6)-(7) and 
19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, claiming Plaintiff lacked 
standing to bring suit and had failed to join an indispensable 
party. (Rec. 40). 
3. The trial court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
without oral argument on the 16th day of July, 1991 (Rec. 91). 
4. Prior to the execution and entry of the Order granting 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint 
naming David M. Dudley, Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust as 
Plaintiff with the same causes of action alleged against 
Defendants. (Rec. 92-104). 
5. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended 
Complaint on the 7th day of August, 1991 pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure claiming that Plaintiff's 
claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitation. (Rec. 
139). 
6. After hearing on September 16, 1991, the trial court 
granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Rec. 213). 
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7. On approximately September 27, 1991, the trial court 
entered its order dismissing Plaintiff's case, (Rec. 218-19). 
8. Plaintiff appealed the two orders of dismissal, which 
appeal was determined by the Utah Court of Appeals on or about 
December 22, 1992. (Rec. 252). 
9. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial 
court, specifically finding that Plaintiff, as the beneficiary of 
the subject Trust, had standing to bring this action. The Court of 
Appeals further found that it was unnecessary to address the 
statute of limitations issue. (Rec. 253-58). 
10. After the case was remanded for further proceedings, 
Plaintiff brought a Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendants 
on or about March 30, 1994. (Rec. 928-29). 
11. Subsequently, on or about April 25, 1994, Defendants 
brought a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment against Plaintiff. 
(Rec. 1279-1280). 
12. After hearing on May 16, 1994, the trial court denied 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment by Minute Entry dated May 17, 1994. 
(Rec. 1641-42). 
13. The Final Order from which Plaintiff appeals was executed 
by the trial court as of June 7, 1994 on July 11, 1994. (Rec. 1717-
19). 
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VI. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 20, 1978, the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement 
was executed by the Trustor, Norman Anderson. See, Affidavit of 
James E. Morton, Para. 3 (Rec. 1036); Depo. of James Norman 
Anderson, pp. 86, 88 (Rec. 1043-44). 
2. Following the creation of the Norman Anderson Trust, an 
account was set up for the Trust at the Salt Lake City branch of 
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, 
Para. 4 (Rec. 1036); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 8 (Rec. 1045). 
3. Defendant, Ralph Pahnke, was the stockbroker engaged to 
manage the Norman Anderson Trust Account. See, Affidavit of James 
E. Morton, Para. 4 (Rec. 1036); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 8 (Rec. 
1045). 
4. Dean Witter policy in force at the time the Norman 
Anderson Trust account was opened required that a copy of the 
complete trust document including amendments, letters of 
resignation or appointment of successor trustees, etc., be secured 
and submitted to the Dean Witter Operations Center for review and 
approval. Seef Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 5 (Rec. 1036); 
Depo. of Kathy Barnett, p. 18 (Rec. 1046); Dean Witter New Accounts 
Procedure, Para. S, p. 17.16 (Rec. 1047). 
5. Following the establishment of the Norman Anderson Trust 
account at Dean Witter, and pursuant to the new accounts policy of 
the firm, the Trustee delivered a complete copy of the Norman 
Anderson Trust Agreement to Defendant Pahnke on or about November 
7 
20, 1978, See. Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 6 (Rec. 1036); 
Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, pp. 9-10 (Rec. 1048-49). 
6. Following delivery of the Norman Anderson Trust Account to 
Dean Witter Reynolds, the trust document was forwarded to the 
Regional Operations Center for review. See, Affidavit of James E. 
Morton, Para. 7 (Rec. 1036); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, pp. 10-11 (Rec. 
1050-51). 
7. During the period in question, Kathy Barnett, the 
operations employee responsible for reviewing trust documents, 
would review approximately 100 trust instruments per day. Ms. 
Barnett has no recollection of having reviewed the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement when it was submitted for approval. £>ee, Affidavit 
of James E. Morton, Para. 8 (Rec. 1037); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, 
pp. 14, 16 (Rec. 1052-53). 
8. At the time of her deposition, Kathy Barnett admitted that 
the scope of review of trust instruments was greater than what was 
testified to in her Affidavit submitted in opposition to 
Plaintiff's original Motion for Summary Judgment. See, Affidavit 
of James E. Morton, Para. 9 (Rec. 1037); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, 
pp. 44-46 (Rec. 1054-56). 
9. Moreover, Ms. Barnett testified that there is no written 
policy governing the review of trust instruments by Dean Witter and 
that she would, on occasion, deviate from her standard review of 
trust instruments. .See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 10 
(Rec. 1037); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 72-73 (Rec. 1057-58). 
10. Following review of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, 
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the Norman Anderson Trust Account was approved for a "cash account" 
only. See. Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 11 (Rec. 1037); 
Affidavit of Kathy Barnett, Para. 11, Exhibit 2 (Rec. 1061 and 
1066). 
11. In connection with the review of trust documents and 
approval of trust accounts, specific Dean Witter Reynolds policies 
provide as follows: 
a. Because of the varying and complex laws which 
govern fiduciaries, it is mandatory that Dean Witter 
obtain the proper legal documents, when dealing with a 
fiduciary. This is necessary in order to determine (1) 
that the fiduciary has been properly appointed; and (2) 
that he is authorized by law and the instrument which 
appoints him to open a securities account; and (3) that 
he is authorized to act with regard to a particular 
transaction (i.e. option, commodity, margin, etc.). The 
Branch Operations Manual, New Accounts Section, 
identifies the documents required in each particular type 
of fiduciary account. The Branch Manager must make sure 
that, prior to the execution of an order for such an 
account, the proper documents have been received and 
approved by the individual in his Operations Center 
delegated to review legal documents. The Operations 
Center will contact the Legal and Compliance Department, 
when necessary, for direction and guidance regarding the 
authority of a particular fiduciary as it relates to 
certain transactions in his account. See, Affidavit of 
James E. Morton, Para. 12 (Rec. 1037); Depo. of Gregory 
Taylor, p. 99, Exhibit 2-D (Rec. 1067-68). 
b. ...most fiduciaries may not enter into 
speculative transactions, such as margin, short, option 
or commodity transaction unless specifically authorized 
by the instrument from which they derive their powers 
(trust document, court order, etc.)... If a fiduciary 
exceeds his authority, a transaction may have to be 
rescinded. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 13 
(Rec. 1037); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, pp. 94-95, Exhibit 
2-C (Rec. 1069-1071). 
c. Current Dean Witter policy requires that trust 
documents be specific if the trust document is to engage 
in margin or options transactions. If the original 
instrument does not so provide, it must be amended. See, 
Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 14 (Rec. 1037); Depo. 
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of Gregory Taylor, pp. 92-93, Exhibit 2-B (Rec 1072-
1074). 
d. Dean Witter Reynolds' policy, based on advice 
from legal counsel, does not permit a trust account to 
conduct margin, option or commodity business unless the 
trust document states the appropriate word - "margin", 
"option" or "commodity". Such words as "encumber" or 
"hypothecate" or the phrase "to borrow money" cannot be 
accepted in lieu of the specific word - "margin", 
"option" or "commodity". See, Affidavit of James E. 
Morton, Para. 15 (Rec. 1038); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, p. 
17, Exhibit 2-A (Rec. 1075); Dean Witter New Accounts 
Procedure, Para. T, p. 17.16 (Rec. 1076). 
e. Generally trust accounts are limited to cash 
only business unless (1) the trust document specifically 
authorizes the speculative powers of margin, option or 
commodity trading.. .. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, 
Para. 16 (Rec. 1038); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, p. 17, 
Exhibit 2-A (Rec. 1077); Dean Witter New Accounts 
Procedure, p. 17.15 (Rec. 1078). 
f. If a trust account wishes to conduct margin, 
option or commodity business, only cash transactions can 
be placed in the account until such time as [the 
Operations Center] reviews the trust document and 
approves the account for margin, option or commodity 
trading. See. Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 17 
(Rec. 1038); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, p. 17, Exhibit 2-A, 
Dean Witter New Accounts Procedure, p. 17.15 (Rec. 1079-
80). 
g. If an existing account is conducting margin or 
option business, the Margin Department will not journal 
positions and/or funds to the new trust account unless 
[the Operations Center] has approved the trust document 
for margin or option trading. See, Affidavit of James E. 
Morton, Para. 18 (Rec. 1038); Depo. of Gregory Taylor, p. 
17, Exhibit 2-A (Rec. 1081); Dean Witter New Accounts 
Procedure, p. 13.72 (Rec. 1082). 
12. The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement was never submitted 
to the Dean Witter Operations Center for approval for margin 
business. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 19 (Rec. 1038); 
Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 34-35 (Rec. 1083-84). 
13. The Norman Anderson Trust Account was approved for cash 
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business only which means margin transactions within the trust 
account would not be permissible. See, Affidavit of James E. 
Morton, Paras. 20-21 (Rec. 1038); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 34-35 
(Rec. 1085-86); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 13 (Rec. 1087). 
14. Notwithstanding the failure to extend approval for margin 
business in the Norman Anderson Trust Account, Dean Witter began to 
process margin transactions in the account in the Spring of 1979, 
shortly following the death of Norman Anderson in March, 1979. 
See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 22 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of 
Ralph Pahnke, p. 18 (Rec. 1088). 
15. In approximately August, 1979, a request was made by the 
Compliance Department of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., to review the 
Norman Anderson trust document. The document was retrieved by 
Kathy Barnett and forwarded to an individual named "Linda Z" in the 
Compliance Department. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 
23 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 76-79, Exhibit 7 (Rec. 
1089-93). 
16. Dean Witter cannot state the purpose for which its 
Compliance Department requested a copy of the Norman Anderson Trust 
nor the extent to which the document was reviewed by the Compliance 
Department See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 23 (Rec. 
1039); Depo. of Kathy Barnett, pp. 76-79 (1089-93). 
17. The proceeds from the margin borrowing out of the Norman 
Anderson Trust Account were used inter aliar to purchase a new 
Mercedes Benz automobile for the personal use of the Trustee of the 
Norman Anderson Trust. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 24 
11 
(Rec. 1039); Depo. of James Norman Anderson, pp. 147-48 (Rec. 1094-
95). 
18. The Norman Anderson Trust required that upon the death of 
the Trustor, Norman Anderson, the assets therein were to be 
deposited into two subordinate trusts created thereunder, to-wit: 
the Norman Anderson Family Trust and the Norman Anderson Marital 
Trust. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 27 (Rec. 1039); 
Depo. of James Norman Anderson, p. 86, Exhibit 15 (Rec. 1100-1122). 
18. 
19. The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Marital Trust and the 
Norman Anderson Family Trust was identical to that designated in 
the Norman Anderson Trust and the powers of the Trustee were 
identical to those conferred on the Trustee in the Norman Anderson 
Trust. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 27 (Rec. 1039); 
Depo. of James Norman Anderson, p. 86, Exhibit 15 (Rec. 1100-1122). 
20. Neither the Norman Anderson Trust, the Marital Trust or 
the Family Trust authorized the Trustee to conduct margin business 
or made any reference to the word "margin". See, Affidavit of 
James E. Morton, Para. 27 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of James Norman 
Anderson, p. 86, Exhibit 15 (Rec. 1100-1122). 
21. In approximately, April, 1980, the Trustee of the Norman 
Anderson Trust found an expensive home in Holladay, Utah, which he 
wanted to purchase. He contacted Defendant Pahnke and informed him 
of his desire to purchase the home. Defendant Pahnke then 
indicated that in order to obtain the funds, it would be necessary 
to come into his office and sign a document which would authorize 
12 
the transfer of the trust funds out of the Norman Anderson Trust 
account and into accounts from which the Trustee could borrow. 
See. Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 25 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of 
James Norman Anderson, pp. 280-81 (Rec. 1096-97). 
22. Upon arriving at Mr. Pahnke's office, a letter entirely 
in Mr. Pahnke's handwriting, and on Dean Witter stationary was 
presented to the Trustee for his signature (hereinafter referred to 
as the "Letter of Authorization") See, Affidavit of James E. 
Morton, Para. 25-26 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of James Norman Anderson, 
pp. 280-81, Exhibit 35 (Rec. 1096-97); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 
20; Exhibit 7 (Rec. 1099); and Letter of Authorization attached as 
an addendum hereto at Exhibit "A". 
23. Notwithstanding the restrictions on the Trustee's power 
to conduct margin business, the letter authored by Defendant Pahnke 
transferring the assets out of the Norman Anderson Trust purported 
to put the assets into the Marital and Family Trust accounts but 
actually put them into two separate margin accounts. See, 
Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 28 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of Ralph 
Pahnke (taken on July 21, 1988), p. 80 (Rec. 1123). 
24. Notwithstanding the reference in Mr. Pahnke's Letter of 
Authorization that the assets being transferred out of the Norman 
Anderson Trust were being transferred into the "Marital Trust" and 
the "Family Trust", there was no attempt by Defendant Pahnke to 
procure copies of either the Marital or Family Trust instruments 
and have them reviewed by the Operations Center of Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. for approval for margin business. See, Affidavit of 
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James E. Morton, Para. 29 (Rec. 1039); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 29 
(Rec. 1124). 
25. The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust was the largest 
single customer Mr. Pahnke had ever represented. .See, Affidavit of 
James E. Morton, Para. 30 (Rec. 1039-40); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke 
(taken on June 29, 1988), p. 44 (Rec. 1125). 
26. In addition to an amendment to the trust agreement, it is 
necessary to have the trustee sign a margin agreement to authorize 
margin trading in a trust account. See, Affidavit of James E. 
Morton, Para. 31 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, p. 16 (Rec. 
1126). 
27. Defendant Pahnke admitted to having forged the signature 
of the Trustee on a margin agreement for the Anna Lee Anderson 
Trust Account. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 32 (Rec. 
1040); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke (taken on July 21, 1988), pp. 44-46 
(Rec. 1127-29). 
28. During the course of their relationship, Defendant Pahnke 
demonstrated a willingness to lie for the benefit of the Trustee of 
the Norman Anderson Trust, including representing to third party 
lenders that all dividend income received in the trust accounts was 
the personal income of the Trustee. See, Affidavit of James E. 
Morton, Para. 33 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of Ralph Pahnke, pp. 34-35 
(Rec. 1130-31). 
29. The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust never informed 
Plaintiff of the transfer of assets out of the Norman Anderson 
Trust until the time the present proceeding was commenced. See, 
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Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 34 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of James 
Norman Anderson, p. 468 (Rec. 1132). 
30. The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust never informed 
Plaintiff, the Beneficiary of the Norman Anderson Trust, of any 
limitations on his authority to margin the assets in the Norman 
Anderson Trust or that Norman Anderson had not signed an amendment 
to his trust to permit margining. See. Affidavit of James E. 
Morton, Para. 35 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of James Norman Anderson, pp. 
468-69 (Rec. 1133-34). 
31. The Trustee of the Norman Anderson Trust had always 
informed Plaintiff that the loss of the assets was solely 
attributable to market conditions and a market crash. See, 
Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 36 (Rec. 1040); Depo. of James 
Norman Anderson, p. 469 (Rec. 1135). 
32. Plaintiff, Anna lee Anderson, did not discover that the 
assets had been wrongfully transferred out of the Norman Anderson 
Trust account or that the assets were wrongfully margined until 
December, 1990, while being prepared to testify as a witness in an 
arbitration hearing involving the Trustee, and Defendants Pahnke 
and Dean Witter. See, Affidavit of James E. Morton, Para. 37 (Rec. 
1040); Depo. of Anna Lee Anderson, p. 94-95 (Rec. 1136-37). 
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VII. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for 
Defendants inasmuch as issues of material fact remain. Pursuant to 
a Minute Entry, dated May 17, 1994, the trial court granted summary 
judgment for Defendants pursuant to three specific findings, to 
wit: Plaintiff's failure to establish Defendants' actual knowledge 
of the contents of a trust established for the benefit of 
Plaintiff; Plaintiff's lack of standing; and the timeliness of 
Plaintiff's claims under applicable statutes of limitation. The 
foregoing legal conclusions are erroneous, and should be reversed. 
A. THE TRANSACTION IN QUESTION VIOLATED THE EXPRESS TERMS OF 
THE NORMAN ANDERSON TRUST, AND DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAME. 
There is no dispute that the transaction which was facilitated 
by Defendants on April 22, 1980 violated the express terms of the 
Norman Anderson Trust. The Trust required distribution into two 
secondary trusts, to wit: the Marital Trust and the Family Trust. 
The Letter of Authorization, drafted by Defendant Pahnke on 
Defendant Dean Witter letterhead, purports to transfer the assets 
into the correct accounts but actually transfers the assets into 
two independent margin accounts. 
The Norman Anderson Trust did not authorize margin borrowing. 
Consequently, the assets in the Trust could not be margined absent 
an amendment from the Trustor, Norman Anderson. Because the date 
of the distribution was subsequent to Mr. Anderson's death, the 
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Trust could not be amended and thus its assets could never be 
margined. In spite of this knowledge, and in contravention of 
Defendants' own policies and procedures and industry standards, 
Defendants placed the assets of the Norman Anderson Trust into 
margin accounts and margined the same. Thereafter, the assets in 
the margin accounts were almost entirely depleted as the result of 
a margin call. 
B. PLAINTIFF IS NOT REQUIRED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANTS HAD 
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE BREACH. 
Pursuant to Otero v. Buslee, 695 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1982), 
Defendants bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense, even 
if it involves the assertion of a negative. Id. The defense of 
statutory immunity due to a lack of actual knowledge under Utah 
Code Ann.. §75-7-406 is a legal, affirmative defense which must be 
asserted by Defendants in their Answer. In addition, Defendants, 
not Plaintiff, bear the burden of proving an affirmative defense. 
Conseguently, as a matter of law, Plaintiff was not required to 
prove Defendants had actual knowledge of the breach, and the trial 
court's ruling to the contrary should be reversed. 
1. Defendant-^ Have Failed in Their Burden to Show 
They Did Not Have Actual Knowledge of the 
Breach. 
Plaintiff has established that Defendants had actual 
knowledge of a breach of the Trust at multiple levels. 
Notwithstanding Dean Witter's review of the Norman Anderson Trust 
and authorizing cash transactions only in the account, Defendants 
permitted margin borrowing. In so doing, Defendants violated 
countless industry standards, Dean Witter policies and their own 
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mandate. 
Concerning Defendants' contention that they owed no duty of 
inquiry to the beneficiary pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §75-7-406, 
Defendants have waived any potential benefit under the statute by 
making actual inquiry. Through securing a copy of the trust 
instrument and reviewing its provisions, Defendants cannot now 
contend that they were not obligated to inquire. 
Finally, as set forth above, Defendants bear the burden of 
proof relative in establishing that they did not have actual 
knowledge of a breach. As made clear by the case in which 
Defendants place total reliance, Adler v. Manor Health Care 
Corp.f 9 Cal Rptr 2d 732 (Cal.App. 1992), Defendants bear the 
burden of producing evidence that they did not review the 
relevant provisions of the Trust. Defendants have completely 
failed to do so. The Trust was reviewed by at least three levels 
of personnel within the Dean Witter organization. Two of the 
three departments cannot say which provisions were reviewed. 
Consequently, Defendants have failed in their burden. 
2. Defendants' Have Waived Their Right to 
Assert the Affirmative Defense of Statutory 
Immunity Under Utah Code Ann., S78-7-406. 
Defendants cannot assert lack of actual knowledge as a 
defense in this case. Defendants have failed to assert statutory 
immunity, for lack of knowledge, pursuant to Utah Code Ann., §78-
7-406 as an affirmative defense. Consequently, the defense is 
waived as a matter of law. See, Golding v. Ashley Cent. 
Irrigation Co., 793 P.2d 899 (Utah 1990); See alsor Rule 12, Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Defendants' Contention That a Review of the 
Relevant Provisions of the Norman Anderson 
Trust Would Not Have Made a Difference Is 
Void of Merit. 
Defendants argued to the trial court that a thorough review 
of the Norman Anderson Trust would not have made a difference. 
In their argument, they partially quoted language from the trust 
agreement which, by substituting punctuation and not quoting the 
entire sentence, was completely mischaracterized. There is no 
question that a thorough review of the Trust reveals that the 
spouse of Norman Anderson, while living, was the sole beneficiary 
of the Trust, and the Trustee was not allowed access to the Trust 
funds for his own personal welfare. 
C. PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS LAWSUIT. 
Defendants' contention that Plaintiff lacks standing flies 
in the face of the express determination made by this Court 
pursuant to a prior appeal. See, Anderson v. Dean Witter 
Reynolds, Inc. et al, 841 P.2d 742 (Utah App. 1992). The 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts clearly provides that a 
beneficiary of a Trust may bring an action against a third party 
for breach of trust under the following circumstances: 
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or neglects to bring 
an action against the third person, the beneficiary can 
maintain a suit in equity against the trustee and the third 
person. 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §282 (1976). In addition, 
Section 327 of the Restatement provides: 
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a breach 
of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from maintaining 
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an action against him therefore, unless: 
(a) The beneficiary is himself guilty of laches . • . 
Restatement (Second^ of Trusts, §327 (1976)- Based upon the 
foregoing, this Court concluded that Plaintiff had standing to 
bring this suit, inasmuch as the Trustee had waited over ten 
years to initiate an action against Defendants. The trial 
court's grant of summary judgment on this issue should be 
reversed. 
D. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE CONCEALED FROM HER BY DEFENDANTS 
AND ARE THEREFORE NOT BARRED BY APPLICABLE STATUTES OF 
LIMITATION. 
Defendants have not adduced any evidence that would suggest 
that Plaintiff discovered, prior to December, 1990, the breaches 
which had occurred in her deceased husband's trust account. 
Several professionals, consisting of accountants and lawyers, had 
a great deal more information than Plaintiff, not to mention 
sophistication, and never discovered the breaches. The one piece 
of evidence that these individuals lacked was the Letter of 
Authorization written by Mr. Pahnke. Without that letter, it was 
literally impossible to determine what had happened in the 
accounts and the losses which were sustained therein appeared to 
be attributable to nothing other than the legitimate exercise of 
the Trustee's authority and market conditions. 
1. Plaintiffrs Claims Are Preserved Under the 
Discovery Rule. 
It is well established that "a cause of action does not 
accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until 
the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of reasonable 
20 
diligence should have learned of the facts which give rise to the 
cause of action-" Klinger v. Rightly, 792 P.2d 868, 879 (Utah 
1990). In the present action, Plaintiff did not discover her 
claims against Defendants until December 1990. Plaintiff was 
unable to discover her claims prior to this time inasmuch as 
Defendants concealed the same from her. 
Despite their obligation to deal with the Trustee, 
Defendants regularly dealt with Plaintiff in this case. 
Notwithstanding their knowledge that the breaches had occurred 
within the Norman Anderson Trust, they never disclosed the same. 
They had an affirmative duty to do so. See, Centerre Bank of 
Independence v. Bliss. 765 S.W.2d 276 (Mo.App. 1988). 
Further, a trust relationship limits the duty of inquiry 
into the existence of a cause of action which would otherwise 
commence the running of a statute of limitation. See, Eisenbaum 
v. Western Energy Resources, Inc., 267 Cal.Rptr. 5 (Cal.App. 
1990). As in Eisenbaum, Plaintiff did not learn of the existence 
of a claim in this case until all of the pieces of the puzzle 
were put together including a review of the distributive 
provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust, the industry standards 
governing margining of accounts and the Letter of Authorization 
drafted by Defendant Pahnke coupled with the technical expertise 
of an attorney. Without that combination of events, Plaintiff 
would have had no way of knowing she had a claim and certainly 
would not have had a duty to inquire based upon the limited 
information to which she had access. 
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2. Plaintifffs Claims Are Preserved Under 
Section 327 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts. 
The law governing Plaintiff's claims, within the context of 
the statute of limitations, is set forth in §327 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts which provides in relevant part: 
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a 
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from 
maintaining an action against him therefore, unless: 
(a) The beneficiary is himself guilty of laches, or; 
(b) A co-trustee who did not participate in the breach 
of trust, or a successor trustee knowing of the claim 
against the third person, fails to bring an action 
against him until he is barred by the statute of 
limitations or by laches. 
The comment on Section (2) of the Restatement (Second) of Trustsr 
§327 similarly provides: 
If a third person knowingly participates in the 
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not barred from 
maintaining a suit against him merely because the 
trustee is barred. The beneficiary will be barred if, 
but only if, he is himself guilty of laches. Thus, the 
beneficiary will not be barred if he is under an 
incapacity or ordinarily if he did not know of the 
breach of trust. 
Id. at 127-128. 
In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence that 
Plaintiff knew of the breach of trust prior to December, 1990, 
the time the Complaint was filed. Consequently, under the 
Restatement, Plaintiff's claims are not barred by the applicable 
statutes of limitation. 
3, Plaintiff is Not Guilty of Laches. 
The establishment of laches requires two elements: lack of 
diligence on the part of Plaintiff and injury to Defendant owing 
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to such lack of diligence. Leaver v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 
1980). Plaintiff initiated her claim within one week of 
discovering it. Moreover, Defendants have not shown any "injury" 
as a result of any alleged lack of diligence on the part of 
Plaintiff. Consequently, Plaintiff's claims are not barred by 
applicable statutes of limitation. 
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VII. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that a party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In the present 
case, the trial court incorrectly concluded that Defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on three separate 
grounds, to wit: Plaintiff's failure to show "actual knowledge" 
on the part of Defendants; Plaintiff's lack of standing; and the 
timeliness of Plaintiff's claims under applicable statutes of 
limitation. 
The entry of summary judgment on these issues was in error. 
As a matter of law, Plaintiff is not required to show "actual 
knowledge" on the part of the Defendants. Nevertheless, the 
facts in this case clearly establish actual knowledge on the part 
of the Defendants or, at the very least, create a material issue 
of fact thereby precluding summary judgment. 
Similarly, the trial court incorrectly concluded, for the 
second time, that Plaintiff lacked standing. This Court 
previously reversed the trial court on this identical issue, 
finding that Plaintiff did indeed have standing to bring this 
suit. 
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Finally, the trial court incorrectly concluded that 
Plaintiff's claims were barred by statutes of limitation. As a 
matter of law, the statute does not commence running against a 
beneficiary under these circumstances unless there is actual 
discovery of the claim. There is no evidence to establish that 
Plaintiff discovered the claim until days prior to its filing. 
Further, notwithstanding their duty to affirmatively disclose the 
violations to Plaintiff, Defendants sat mute. They, along with 
the Trustee, concealed the claim from Plaintiff. The claim was 
so well concealed that accountants and attorneys who had far more 
information and sophistication than Plaintiff did not determine 
that there had been a violation of the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement. Given Defendants' relationship with both the Trustee 
and Beneficiary, the duty of Plaintiff to inquire was limited as 
a matter of law. Consequently, Plaintiff's claim is not barred 
by statutes of limitation. 
A. THE TRANSACTION IN QUESTION VIOLATED THE EXPRESS TERMS 
OF THE NORMAN ANDERSON TRUST, AND DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE SAME. 
This case turns on the propriety of a single, isolated 
transaction which occurred in April, 1980. The transaction in 
question involved the wrongful transfer of all of the assets out 
of the Norman Anderson Trust into two independent margin 
accounts, including the personal account of the Trustee. The 
transfer violated the express terms of the Norman Anderson Trust 
Agreement and was facilitated by both the Trustee of the Norman 
Anderson Trust, and Ralph Pahnke, a stockbroker employed by Dean 
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Witter Reynolds, Inc. Given the obvious culpability of the 
Trustee and stockbroker, the claim was never pursued by the 
Trustee and was not discovered by the Beneficiary until days 
prior to the filing of the present action. 
There is no dispute that Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter 
received a complete copy of the Norman Anderson Trust Agreement 
prior to the transfer in question. (Rec. 1036; 1048-49). There 
is also no dispute that the entire trust agreement was forwarded 
to the Regional Operations Center of Dean Witter in San 
Francisco, California for review and approval. (Rec. 1036; 1050-
51). Following that review, the Operations Center approved the 
trust account for a "cash account only". (Rec. 1037, 1061, 1066). 
By definition, a cash account means that the account may not be 
margined without further approval. (Rec. 1038; 1085-87). 
Pursuant to Dean Witter policy and governing law, the 
margining of assets in the account could not have been approved 
except through an amendment to the trust by the Trustor, Norman 
Anderson. (Rec. 1037; 1072-74). At the time the assets were 
transferred, Norman Anderson had been dead for approximately six 
weeks. Consequently, he could not have amended the trust 
instrument and any power to authorize the margining of assets 
within the trust died with Mr. Anderson. 
The Norman Anderson Trust Agreement is clear with respect to 
the distribution plan of the trust upon the occurrence of the 
death of the Trustor, Norman Anderson. Following Mr. Anderson's 
death, the assets owned by the trust were to be distributed into 
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two separate trusts known as the Marital Trust and Family Trust. 
The Marital and Family Trusts are created within the Norman 
Anderson Trust document. The Trustee of the Norman Anderson 
Trust is also designated Trustee of the Marital and Family 
trusts. The powers of the Trustee are also identical with 
respect to all three trusts. There is no provision for margin 
business. (Rec. 1039; 1100-1122). 
Instead of transferring the assets of the Norman Anderson 
Trust into the Martial and Family Trusts as required by the 
Norman Anderson Trust Agreement, the assets were actually 
transferred into two separate margin accounts including an 
account for the sole, personal benefit of the Trustee, James N. 
Anderson. (Rec. 1039 and 1123). The text of the Letter of 
Authorization which facilitated the transfer of assets out of the 
Norman Anderson Trust and into the two margin accounts is 
entirely in the handwriting of Defendant, Ralph Pahnke1. (Rec. 
1039; 1096-97; 1099). It is on Dean Witter letterhead. 
Certainly, it cannot be disputed that Dean Witter participated in 
the breach of the Trust Agreement. (See: Exhibit "A" to the 
Addendum attached hereto). 
There is no question that the transfer which took place 
pursuant to Defendant Pahnkefs Letter of Authorization violated 
the express terms of the Norman Anderson Trust. The Letter of 
Authorization purported to place the assets into accounts which 
1
 A true and accurate copy of the "Letter of Authorization" 
is attached as an addendum hereto at Exhibit "A". 
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were denominated as the "Marital Trust" and "Family Trust" but 
actually placed the assets into unrelated margin accounts. 
Notwithstanding the reguirement that Dean Witter obtain a 
complete copy of the trust agreement from the Trustee and have 
the agreement scrutinized by the Operations Center prior to 
approving margin business, Mr. Pahnke circumvented all of these 
procedural requirements by simply maintaining the accounts in 
other names. (Rec. 1039; 1123-24). 
Mr. Pahnke literally violated every relevant procedure of 
Dean Witter in order to facilitate access to funds for what 
proved to be his largest client ever. Consider the following: 
a. Dean Witter policy mandates that trust accounts will be 
approved on a cash basis only unless the trust instrument 
specifically authorizes the trustee to margin the assets therein. 
(Rec. 1038; 1072-82). Mr. Pahnke knew the Norman Anderson Trust 
was approved for a cash account only. In addition, he made no 
attempt to have the Marital and Family Trusts reviewed by the 
Operations Center to determine whether they were eligible for 
margin business; (Rec. 1039, 1124). 
b. Mr. Pahnke knew that it was necessary to amend a trust 
agreement if it did not expressly provide for margin business. 
This policy was included in Mr. Pahnke's Account Executive Policy 
Manual. Mr. Pahnke also knew the Trustor was dead and amendment 
of the Trust was thus unavailable; and 
c. Dean Witter policy provides that if an existing account 
is conducting margin business, it will not transfer or "journal" 
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the assets in that account to a new trust account unless the 
Operations Center has approved the trust document in the 
transferee account for margin business. Moreover, it is 
incumbent upon the Account Executive to secure a copy of the 
trust document for review before any such transfer is made. 
(Rec. 1038; 1081-82). Notwithstanding Mr. Pahnke's handwritten 
Letter of Authorization purportedly transferring the assets in 
the Norman Anderson Trust to the "Marital Trust" and "Family 
Trust", he made no attempt to secure copies of the trust 
instruments from the Trustee or have them reviewed by the Dean 
Witter Regional Operations Center. (Rec. 1039, 1124). 
The losses which were sustained by the Norman Anderson Trust 
were the result of a margin call. Obviously, had the wrongful 
transfer to margin accounts not occurred, the losses would not 
have been sustained. 
It is well-established that a third party who participated 
with a fiduciary in a breach of his duty to the beneficiary is 
liable to the beneficiary. See, Restatement (Second) Trustsf 
§326 (1976). See also, Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 
U.S. 286 (1942). More specifically, " . . . one who, even 
without breaching any duty owed on his own behalf, aids a trustee 
in breaching the fiduciary duty . . . may be held liable as a de 
facto trustee even if he does not benefit from the breach."2 
2
 Notwithstanding the fact that Defendants acted as "de 
facto" trustees and can therefore be held liable even if they 
didn't benefit from the breach, it should be noted that Defendant 
Pahnke made more in commissions off of these margin accounts than 
off of any other customer in his career and Dean Witter made in 
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Wisconsin Real Estate Investment Trust v. Weinstein, 509 F.Supp. 
1289, 1300 (E.D. Wis. 1981). See also, U.S. v. Rivieccio, 661 
F.Supp. 281, 294 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). It is abundantly clear that 
Defendants Pahnke and Dean Witter knowingly participated with the 
Trustee in the breach of the Norman Anderson Trust and, in so 
doing, damaged the Beneficiary. 
Notwithstanding all of the policies governing the review and 
approval of trust accounts and the specific requirement that 
trust accounts be amended before margin business is conducted if 
express authority to margin is not conferred upon the Trustee, 
Dean Witter permitted margin borrowing by the Trustee in the 
Norman Anderson Trust account itself and later permitted the 
transfer of the assets in the account into two independent margin 
accounts. (Rec. 1039; 1088 and 1123). Defendants claim all of 
this was accomplished without the benefit of further review, 
approval and amendment as required by Dean Witter's own policies 
and procedures. 
In spite of the foregoing, Dean Witter has taken the 
incredible position that it is entitled to immunity from 
liability for its participation in the breach of trust because of 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §75-7-406 which provide: 
With respect to a third person dealing with a trustee or 
assisting a trustee in the conduct of a transaction, the 
existence of trust power and the proper exercise by the 
trustee may be assumed without inquiry. The third person is 
not bound to inquire whether the trustee has power to act or 
is properly exercising the power; and a third person, 
without actual knowledge that the trustee is exceeding his 
excess of one million dollars in margin interest. 
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power or improperly exercising themf is fully protected in 
the dealings with the trustee as if the trustee possessed 
and properly exercised the powers he purports to exercise. 
A third person is not bound to assure the proper application 
of trust assets paid or delivered to the trustee. 
(emphasis added). 
Defendants' position is seriously flawed for a variety of 
reasons. The statute in question immunizes third persons from a 
"duty of inquiry" which, under the common law, attached to third 
persons who dealt with a trustee. While the statute may relieve 
a third person of the obligation to inquire, it is undisputed 
that Defendants did inquire. They requested the trust 
instrument. They reviewed it. They approved it for restricted 
business. Thereafter, they violated it. 
It is a well-established principle that one who volunteers 
to act, although under no duty to do so, is thereafter charged 
with the duty to act reasonably and is liable for damages for 
injury resulting from the breach of that duty. See, Rudolph v. 
First Southern Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. 414 S.2d 64, 67 
(Ala. 1982). In Rudolph, homeowners entered into an agreement 
with a contractor for the purpose of constructing improvements to 
their home. When First Southern agreed to finance the 
improvements, it employed an inspector who would periodically 
inspect the progress of the construction prior to satisfying a 
draw request from the contractor. As in this case, the lender 
testified that the inspections were for its sole benefit to 
enable it to determine whether sufficient improvements had been 
constructed to constitute [security] for its construction loan. 
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The contractor defaulted on the construction contract and failed 
to pay various materialmen and subcontractors. Notwithstanding 
the complete absence of a duty to inspect and approve the 
construction, the Alabama Supreme Court found that the lender had 
assumed a duty through its voluntary undertaking. Id. at 65-67. 
In the present case, Dean Witter may very well have 
insulated itself from liability had it not undertook to inquire 
concerning the limitations of authority of the Trustee of the 
Norman Anderson Trust. However, it did inquire. As a 
consequence thereof, it may not seek refuge in the provisions of 
Utah Code Ann.r §75-7-406, nor may it claim it did not have 
actual knowledge of the breach. Based on the foregoing, factual 
disputes preclude entry of summary judgment in Defendants' favor 
on the issue of "actual knowledge". 
B. AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF IS NOT REQUIRED TO SHOW 
THAT DEFENDANTS HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE BREACH. 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the 
grounds that Plaintiff failed to show Defendants had actual 
knowledge of the breach. Notwithstanding the fact that Plaintiff 
can establish actual knowledge on Defendants' part as set forth 
above, as a matter of law, Plaintiff is not required to do so. 
It is universally recognized that Defendants have the burden of 
proof with respect to their affirmative defenses. See, Empire 
State Building Co. v. Bryde, 318 N.W.2d 65 (Neb. 1982). See 
also. Otero v. Busleef 695 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1982); 
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board v. T.J.J.R. Inc., 548 A.2d 390 
(Pa. 1988); Pace v. Hymas, 726 P.2d 693 (Idaho 1986). In Otero, 
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the Tenth Circuit held that the Defendant bears the burden of 
proving an affirmative defense, even if he must assert a 
negative. This, of course, has particular significance to this 
case because of Dean Witter's claimed entitlement to statutory 
immunity and its suggestion that it did not have "actual 
knowledge" of the relevant provisions of the Norman Anderson 
Trust. These defenses are affirmative defenses which must be 
asserted by Defendants in their answer. Consequently, the burden 
is upon Defendants to show they did not have "actual knowledge". 
Plaintiff was not legally required to show Defendants had actual 
knowledge, as was determined by the Trial Court. 
1- Defendants Have Failed in Their Burden to 
Show They Did Not Have Actual Knowledge of a 
Breach. 
Defendants have failed in their burden to show they did not 
have actual knowledge of the breach. Defendants acknowledge 
their obligation to follow the instructions of the Trustee unless 
they have actual knowledge of a violation of the Trust Agreement. 
From the commencement of this action, Plaintiff has contended 
that Defendants were aware of a breach of the Trust in several 
particulars. Her contentions are substantiated by both the 
evidence and the law. First, there is no dispute that Defendants 
had actual knowledge that the assets in the Norman Anderson Trust 
could not be margined. Their policies, rather than internal 
administrative guidelines, reflect industry standards, as 
confirmed by their own experts and the specific language of the 
policies. 
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The standard in the industry was to review and approve every 
trust instrument for margin business. (Rec. 1038; 1079-80). If 
the trust did not specifically authorize margin trading, it would 
either have to be amended or, at the very least, permission would 
have to be given by the trustor to permit this speculative 
practice. (Rec. 1037; 1072-74). Defendants originally reviewed 
the Norman Anderson Trust and approved if for cash business only. 
(Rec. 1038; 1085-87). Thereafter, when the assets of the Trust 
were purportedly distributed into the Marital and Family Trusts, 
there was no attempt to determine whether these secondary trusts 
were eligible for margin business, nor was there any attempt to 
resubmit the Norman Anderson Trust for approval for margin 
business.3 (Rec. 1039, 1124). Defendants knew that the Norman 
Anderson Trust had not been approved for margin business. 
However, without regard to the mandates contained in the Trust or 
their own policies and industry standards, they margined the 
assets anyway. (Rec. 1039, 1088). Without question, Defendants 
knew that without first seeking the authorization of the Trustor, 
they had breached the Trust. 
Second, as previously discussed, Defendants' contention that 
they had no duty of inquiry due to the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, §75-7-406, is equally void of merit. It is inherently 
inconsistent to say on the one hand that Defendants have no duty 
J
 It is clear that had the Trust been submitted for margin 
approval it would not have been approved. The Trust did not 
specifically provide for margin business, nor could it have been 
amended as the Trustor, Norman Anderson, had died. 
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of inquiry and, on the other, that they can actually make inquiry 
and still enjoy third party immunity under the statute. The 
facts in this case are absolutely beyond dispute that Defendants 
procured a complete copy of the Norman Anderson Trust, reviewed 
it, and based upon that review, limited the kind of business that 
could be done in the Trust Account. Thereafter, they violated 
their own self-imposed restriction by permitting the assets in 
the Trust to be margined. There is simply no immunity under 
these circumstances. 
Finally, and certainly no less compelling than the other 
grounds stated hereinabove, is that Defendants have the burden of 
proof relative to establishing that they did not have actual 
knowledge. See, Otero, supra. Defendants place complete 
reliance upon Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp., 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 732 
(Cal.App. 1992). Their reliance is misplaced. Adler, stands for 
the precise proposition urged by Plaintiff, to wit: That the 
burden is upon Defendants to establish that they did not have 
actual knowledge. Consider the language of the Adler Court: 
Manor submitted the declarations of several employees of 
both Manor and its agent, First American, who had been 
directly involved in the subject transaction. In each case, 
these individuals affirmed that they had no knowledge 
whatsoever of any alleged lack of authority on the part of 
Golden Rain to make the conveyance. 
Id. at 737. (Emphasis added). 
In the present case, Defendants have failed to produce 
competent evidence that the Operations Center of Dean Witter or 
its Compliance Department did not review the relevant provisions 
of the Norman Anderson Trust. With respect to the Operations 
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Center, the individual who reviewed the Trust, Kathy Barnett, 
states that she has no memory of having reviewed the Trust. (Rec. 
1037; 1052-53). She cannot state unequivocally that she did not 
review the provisions in question. (Rec. 1037; 1052-58). 
With respect to the Compliance Department, Defendants have a 
problem of even greater proportion. Defendants know that the 
document was requested by the Compliance Department for review. 
(Rec. 1039; 1089-93). They don't know why. (Rec. 1039; 1089-93). 
Despite Defendants' creative attempts to mischaracterize their 
own witnesses' testimony, it is clear that the Compliance 
Department review was not for the purpose of authorizing margin 
business.4 Consequently, Dean Witter's attempt to claim that it 
did not review the distribution provisions of the Trust fall 
short of the mark. Under any of the three scenarios set forth 
above, Dean Witter had actual knowledge of the breach. 
Consequently, it may not seek refuge in this defense, and it was 
not entitled to summary judgment in its favor. 
2. Defendants' Have Waived Their Right to Assert 
the Affirmative Defense of Statutory Immunity 
Under Utah Code Ann.r S75-7-406. 
Assuming arguendo that Defendants could show they were 
4
 Given the proximity in time to the wrongful margin business 
that was being conducted in the Norman Anderson Trust during the 
summer months of 1979, shortly following the Trustor's death, and 
the date the Compliance Department requested a copy of the trust 
document (August, 1979), it is probable that the Compliance 
Department sought to determine the propriety of the Trustee 
conducting margin business. The transfer of assets into 
established margin accounts thereafter eliminated the appearance of 
a problem. Defendants cannot locate any documentation of what went 
on within the Compliance Department after the document was 
forwarded to the Department by the Operations Center. 
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statutorily immune as a result of having no actual knowledge of 
the breach, they waived their right to assert the same as an 
affirmative defense. It is well-established that if an 
affirmative defense is not asserted, it is waived. See, Golding 
v. Ashley Cent. Irrigation Co.. 793 P.2d 897 (Utah 1990). The 
defense of statutory immunity is clearly a legal or affirmative 
defense and must be asserted in the Answer. In the present case, 
Defendants failed to plead statutory immunity under Utah Code 
Annotated §75-7-406 as an affirmative defense. Consequently, it 
has been waived. See, Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Defendants' Contention That a Review of the 
Relevant Provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust 
Would Not Have Made a Differenge Is Void of 
Merit, 
Defendants, after desperately attempting to disclaim any 
knowledge of the contents of a document which was reviewed by 
three levels of personnel within its organization, next claim 
that even if they had reviewed the document, it would have made 
no difference. In order to make the argument, Defendants 
mischaracterized certain provisions of the Norman Anderson Trust 
by only partially guoting the referenced sections or referring 
the trial court to portions of the document which have no 
relevance to the transaction in question. For example, 
Defendants attempted to quote a portion of Section 3.3.IB of the 
Marital Trust by stating that the Trust allowed payment of 
Marital Trust Funds for "Trustor's wife and familyf and for funds 
to enable the purchase of residences". (Emphasis added by 
Defendants). It is remarkable that Defendants would change the 
37 
punctuation in the quote and not include the remainder of the 
clause in Section 3.3.IB which states: ". . . and for funds to 
enable the purchase of residences, the Trustee, at any time and 
from time to time, may in his sole discretion pay or distribute 
to Trustorfs wife so much of the principal of the Trust as he 
shall deem necessary or advisable under the circumstances". 
(Emphasis added). (Rec. 1100-1122). 
The mere fact that Defendants referred the trial court to 
dispositive provisions of the Marital Trust instead of the Norman 
Anderson Trust underscores the weakness of their position. This 
transaction is concerned solely with the disposition of the 
Norman Anderson Trust. The dispositive provision of the Norman 
Anderson Trust states: 
3.2.2. Wife Surviving. If Trustor's wife does survive 
Trustor, the Trustee shall divide the trust estate, 
including all assets distributable to the Trust by 
reason of the death of Trustor, into two separate 
trusts, the first to be called the "Marital Trust" and 
the second the "Family Trust" to be administered as 
provided in 3.3 and 3.4. 
Norman Anderson Trust, §3.2.2. (Emphasis added). (Rec. 1100-
1122). 
In addition to their obvious attempt to distort the language 
of the Trust, Defendants also overlook the fact that the Letter 
of Authorization authored by Defendant Pahnke on April 22, 1980 
was really no more than a ruse. Notwithstanding the language in 
the letter, which created the appearance of complying with the 
dispositive provision of the Norman Anderson Trust, the assets 
were actually routed into entirely unrelated accounts which set 
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the stage for self-dealing and the ultimate loss of a substantial 
amount of equity in the accounts. See: Letter of Authorization, 
attached as an addendum at Exhibit "A". 
C. PLAINTIFF HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS LAWSUIT. 
1. This Court Already Determined that Anna Lee 
Anderson Has Standing to Bring This Suit. 
Defendants' contention that Plaintiff lacks standing is 
simply wrong. This issue, along with the statute of limitations, 
has already been developed in the prior appeal of this case and 
has been resolved in favor of Plaintiff. See, Anderson v. Dean 
Witter Reynolds. Inc., et al., 841 P.2d 742 (Utah App. 1992). In 
Anderson, this Court held: 
In the present situation, it is clear from the complaint the 
beneficiary could prove facts showing she had standing to 
bring suit against the third parties for the improper 
distribution of stock. She could show, at the very least, 
the Trustee improperly "neglected" to bring action against 
the appellees when he waited over ten years after the 
improper transfer and still did not bring suit. 
Id. at 745. (Emphasis added). 
The only inquiry relevant to the standing issue was whether 
the Trustee had neglected to file a lawsuit within ten years of 
the improper transfer. Notwithstanding Defendants' protestations 
to the contrary, Plaintiff has no obligation under the Anderson 
decision to demonstrate hostility between the Trustee and 
beneficiary. Consequently, Plaintiff's right to bring this 
lawsuit is irrefutable, and the Trial Court's ruling to the 
contrary must be reversed. 
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2. Anna Lee Anderson, as Beneficiary of the Norman 
Anderson Trust, is the Proper Party to Bring 
Suit in This Case, 
While it is a generally accepted principle that 
beneficiaries of a trust cannot maintain an action against third 
parties who have acted adversely to the trust, there are 
exceptions to this rule which apply in the present case. Section 
282 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts provides in relevant 
part: 
. . . 
(2) If the trustee improperly refuses or neglects to 
bring an action against the third person, the 
beneficiary can maintain a suit in eguity against the 
trustee and the third person. 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, §282 (1976). In addition, 
Section 327 of the Restatement provides 
(2) If the third person knowingly participated 
in a breach of trust, the beneficiary is not 
precluded from maintaining an action against 
him therefore, unless: 
(a) The beneficiary is himself guilty of laches . . . 
As set forth in the preceding section, this Court found these 
provisions directly on point and concluded that under the 
circumstances of this case, Anna Lee Anderson was entitled to 
maintain the present suit. 
D. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WERE CONCEALED FROM HER BY DEFENDANTS 
AND ARE THEREFORE NOT BARRED BY APPLICABLE STATUTES OF 
LIMITATION. 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on 
the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs claims are not barred by 
the statute of limitations and are preserved under three separate 
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legal theories set forth below. 
1. Plaintiff's Claims Are Preserved Under the 
Discovery Rule, 
It is well established that "a cause of action does not 
accrue and the statute of limitations does not begin to run until 
the plaintiff learns of or in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have learned of the facts which give rise to the 
cause of action." Klinger v. Rightly, 792 P.2d 868, 869 (Utah 
1990). In the present action, Plaintiff did not discover her 
claim against Defendants until December 1990. (Rec. 1040; 1136-
37). Plaintiff was unable to discover her claim prior to this 
time inasmuch as Defendants concealed the same from her. 
There is no dispute in this case that in addition to dealing 
with the Trustee, the beneficiary also dealt directly with 
Defendant Pahnke. Notwithstanding those relationships, neither 
the Trustee nor Defendants disclosed to Plaintiff that a breach 
of trust had occurred. It is universal that when a party stands 
in a fiduciary relationship or otherwise possesses superior 
knowledge of a condition, there exists a duty to affirmatively 
disclose material facts. £e£, Centerre Bank of Independence v. 
Bliss, 765 SW.2d 276 (Mo.App. 1988). See alsor Shea v. H.S. 
Pickrell Company, Inc., 748 P.2d 980 (N.M.App. 1987) (Duty on 
part of lender if one party to the transaction has superior 
knowledge not possessed by the other party or has knowledge that 
the other party is acting under a mistaken belief as to a 
material fact). 
In the present case, both the Trustee and Dean Witter were 
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aware of the Letter of Authorization which facilitated the 
improper transfer. The transfer placed the assets in margin 
accounts where they were not supposed to be. None of this was 
disclosed to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff was obviously laboring 
under the mistaken belief that what was happening was entirely 
legitimate. Given the undisputed fact that Plaintiff dealt 
directly with Defendants during the period surrounding the 
breach, Defendants' argument that it cannot be tied to the 
concealment of the Trustee is also without merit. Given 
Defendants' direct participation in the breach of trust, their 
duty to disclose material facts to the beneficiary was no 
different than that of the Trustee. 
It is well-recognized that a trust relationship limits the 
duty of inquiry into the existence of a cause of action which 
would otherwise commence the running of the statute of 
limitations. See, Eisenbaum v. Western Energy Resourcesr Inc.r 
267 Cal.Rep. 5 (Cal.App. 1990). In Eisenbaumf the buyer of a 
limited partnership interest in an oil and gas venture was 
entitled to rely upon his assumption that the general partners in 
the venture had told him the truth about the legality of the 
transaction. Consequently, the statute of limitations did not 
commence to run on an action for rescission until such time as 
the purchaser received advice from his attorney that the sale of 
the limited partnership interest was illegal. 
5
 Defendants' compliance expert, Allan Rockier, has testified 
that computer technology employed by Dean Witter would have alerted 
the brokerage to the improper margin activity. (Rec. 1420). 
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The facts of the present case are similar to Eisenbaum in 
that Plaintiff first learned of the illegality of the subject 
transaction through counsel. Plaintiff, an elderly high school 
graduate, was hardly capable of evaluating the legality of this 
transaction without access to critical information such as the 
Letter of Authorization.6 As indicated above, even greater 
luminaries such as accountants and lawyers never even suspected 
any impropriety in connection with the transaction. 
Consequently, Defendants' suggestion that Plaintiff somehow had a 
duty to make a more extraordinary inquiry is unfounded. 
2. Plaintiff'e Claims Are Preserved Under Section 
327 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 
The law governing Plaintiff's claims, within the context of 
0
 The account statements for the two margin accounts in 
question were sent directly to the Trustee, who did not provide 
copies of the same to the Beneficiary. Similarly, the Beneficiary 
was never provided a copy of the Letter of Authorization which 
transferred the trust funds into the margin accounts. These facts 
are significant as the account statements and the Letter of 
Authorization are the only tangible evidence that the assets of the 
Norman Anderson Trust were transferred into the wrong accounts. 
The Letter of Authorization identifies the numbered accounts into 
which the assets of the Norman Anderson Trust were actually placed. 
The numbered accounts were, in reality, unrelated margin accounts, 
not the Marital or Family Trust accounts. Similarly, the account 
statements identify the margin accounts into which the trust funds 
were placed. Without the Letter of Authorization and/or the 
account statements, the beneficiary could not possibly have known 
that the trust funds were placed in the wrong accounts. 
7
 Defendants' reliance upon Leggroan v. Zions Savings Bankf 
232 P.2d 746 (Utah 1951) is misplaced. Leggroan deals with the 
issue of notice, for the purpose of the commencement of 
limitations, beginning to run when the trustee retains property in 
the trust after final distribution. It is undisputed that the 1984 
margin calls did not eliminate the entire equity from these 
accounts. Even following the calls, there existed a cash balance 
in the accounts. The trust remained active thereafter. 
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the statute of limitations, is set forth in §327 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts which provides in relevant part: 
(2) If the third person knowingly participated in a 
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not precluded from 
maintaining an action against him therefore, unless: 
(a) The beneficiary is himself guilty of laches, or; 
(b) A co-trustee who did not participate in the breach 
of trust, or a successor trustee knowing of the claim 
against the third person, fails to bring an action 
against him until he is barred by the statute of 
limitations or by laches. 
The comment on Section (2) of the Restatement I Second) of Trustsf 
§327 similarly provides: 
If a third person knowingly participates in the 
breach of trust, the beneficiary is not barred from 
maintaining a suit against him merely because the 
trustee is barred. The beneficiary will be barred if, 
but only if, he is himself guilty of laches. Thus, the 
beneficiary will not be barred if he is under an 
incapacity or ordinarily if he did not know of the 
breach of trust. 
Id. at 127-128. 
In the present case, there is absolutely no evidence that 
Plaintiff knew of the breach of trust prior to December, 1990, 
the time the Complaint was filed. In fact, it is clear from the 
evidence that the Trustee was well aware of the fact that the 
express terms of the trust had been violated and concealed that 
from the Beneficiary by simply informing her that the losses were 
the result of market conditions. (Rec. 1040; 1132-35). 
Dean Witter knowingly participated with the Trustee in the 
breach of the trust. It had secured a complete copy of the trust 
instrument from the Trustee. (Rec. 1036; 1048-49). Its employee, 
Ralph Pahnke, handwrote the Letter of Authorization on Dean 
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Witter letterhead transferring all of the assets out of the Trust 
in violation of the Trust Agreement. (Rec. 1039; 1096-97; 1099 
and Exhibit "A"). The assets were transferred into margin 
accounts in violation of Dean Witter policy and the common law8 
after the Regional Operations Center of Dean Witter had informed 
the Salt Lake City branch that the Norman Anderson Trust Account 
could be administered on a cash account basis only. (Rec. 1038; 
1085-87 and 1123). To deny a knowing participation in the breach 
of trust by Dean Witter required the undisputed facts in this 
proceeding to be ignored. 
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's alleged knowledge of a 
margin account coupled with knowledge of losses sustained in a 
margin call commenced the running of the statute of limitations. 
Defendants completely miss the point. The issue surrounding 
Plaintiff's discovery of her claim involved learning that the 
assets of the Norman Anderson Trust had actually been placed in 
the wrong accounts and that the accounts were improperly 
margined. She had no way of acquiring that information. She did 
not receive statements from Dean Witter on any of these accounts. 
Notwithstanding her interaction with the Trustee and Defendant 
Pahnke, both of whom knew of the breach of trust, she was not 
informed. Consequently, Plaintiff was left to believe that the 
losses which had occurred in the account were no more than the 
b
 See, Merrill, Lynch, Pierce & Smith, Inc. v. Bocock, 247 
F.Supp. 373 (S.D. Texas 1965); In re Shaner Estatef 26 D&C 2d 450 
(Pa. 1961). See also, Scott, Trusts, §227.6 Vol. Ill, p. 444 
(1988); Loring, A Trustee's Handbook, §55 at 156 (5th Ed. 1940). 
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result of the legitimate exercise of powers of the Trustee 
(margin activity) and market conditions (the decline in value of 
securities owned by the Trust). 
Perhaps the most compelling evidence of Plaintiff's 
legitimate non-discovery of the breach involves the many 
professionals with whom the Trustee did business. The Trustee 
employed certified public accountants and attorneys to deal with 
issues concerning the trust accounts and his individual account. 
These professionals had a great deal more information than 
Plaintiff ever had. They had access to account statements, 
information provided by Defendant Pahnke from Dean Witter and 
other source documentation, including the relevant trust 
documents. They understood the distribution provisions in the 
Norman Anderson Trust. Yet not one of these professionals ever 
suspected that there had been a breach of the Norman Anderson 
Trust Agreement. They have testified that they would have 
alerted Plaintiff had they known. (Rec. 1354-1357; 1463-1495). 
Given the information to which they had access, coupled with 
their sophistication, how is it that a 71 year old woman with a 
high school education and no information was supposed to have 
discovered the breach when these professionals could not. 
The one, single piece of information that each of these 
individuals, including Plaintiff, was lacking, was the Letter of 
Authorization authored by Mr. Pahnke. The Letter of 
Authorization unlocks the mysteries concerning how the breach of 
trust was accomplished. Without it, the losses appeared to have 
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been entirely legitimate. 
It is absolutely clear that under Section 327 of the 
Restatement (Second1 of Trusts, the beneficiary is not barred by 
the statute of limitations "if [she] did not know of the breach 
of trust." See, Comment to §327 (2). In the present case, 
Defendants, despite having taken the deposition of everyone who 
had even the most peripheral contact with this case, have failed 
to adduce evidence that Plaintiff knew of the breach prior to 
December 1990. Consequently, their statute of limitations 
defense necessarily fails. 
3. Plaintiff is Not Guilty of Laches, 
The beneficiary is certainly not guilty of laches. Within 
several days of discovering the breach of trust, she immediately 
caused the Complaint in the present action to be filed. There is 
no evidence to the contrary. Moreover, it is clear that the mere 
passage of time is not enough to invoke the doctrine of laches. 
See, Gillespie v. Seymour, 823 P.2d 782 (Kan. 1991) (failure of 
co-trustee to bring action arising out of alleged misapplication 
of trust's oil and gas investment could not be utilized to bar, 
under doctrine of laches, beneficiaries from bringing action; 
beneficiaries moved promptly to bring action upon learning of the 
facts). See also. Matter of Trust Created by Belgard v. Johnson, 
829 P.2d 457 (Colo.App. 1991) (remainderman's cause of action for 
breach of trust accrued when breach of trust was discovered); 
Skok v. Snyder, 733 P.2d 547 (Wash.App. 1987) (in order to set 
statute of limitations in motion against beneficiary, trustee's 
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repudiation of express trust must be plain, strong and 
unequivocal; repudiation may be by words or by other conduct by 
which trustee denies trust and claims property as his own, but 
such action must be open and, to be effective, must be brought 
home to beneficiary). 
Defendants have not adduced any evidence that would support 
a finding that Plaintiff knew, prior to 1990, that there had been 
a repudiation of the trust or, equally important, that Dean 
Witter had participated therein. To the contrary, Plaintiff was 
always led to believe that the losses sustained were nothing more 
than the result of a market crash and were not attributable to 
any impropriety on the part of the Trustee or any third person 
dealing with the Trustee. It was not until December, 1990, only 
days before the Complaint was filed in this matter, that the 
discovery of the breach of trust was made. Neither the statute 
nor laches may bar recovery. 
In addition, the defense of laches is dependent upon two 
elements, to wit: lack of diligence on the part of the Plaintiff 
and injury to Defendant owing to such lack of diligence. Plateau 
Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands, 802 P.2d 720, 731 
(Utah 1990). See also: Leaver v. Groser 610 P.2d 1262 (Utah 
1980). As Defendants have wholly failed to produce evidence in 
support of either element, their defense of laches must 
necessarily fail. 
4. This Court Has Already Ruled That Plaintiff Is 
Entitled to Assert These Claims. 
As referenced above, this matter has already been taken up 
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on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. While this Court 
expressly determined it was not necessary to decide the issue 
associated with the statute of limitations, it did comment: 
[I]t is clear from the complaint the beneficiary could 
prove facts showing she had standing to bring suit against 
the third parties for the improper distribution of stock, 
she could show, at the very least, the trustee improperly 
"neglected" to bring an action against the appellees when he 
waited over ten years after the improper transfer and still 
did not bring suit. 
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, et ah, 841 P.2d 742, 745 (Utah 
App. 1992) (emphasis added). The clear implication of this 
holding is that Plaintiff not only has standing to bring her 
claims, said claims are not barred by the statute of limitations. 
If the Court had found that the statute of limitations barred 
Plaintiff's claims, it likely would have ruled that the trial 
court's dismissal of Plaintiff's claims for lack of standing was 
harmless error. Inasmuch as this Court found it unnecessary to 
address the statute of limitations issue, in conjunction with its 
finding that Plaintiff had standing to bring this suit, there can 
be no question that this Court did not believe the same would bar 
Plaintiff's claims. 
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IX • 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court erred in granting Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. Genuine issues of material fact precluded a 
finding that there was a lack of actual knowledge on the part of 
Defendants that a violation of the provisions of the Norman 
Anderson Trust had occurred. Similarly, factual issues and the 
prior decision of this Court rendered improvident the Trial 
Court's determination that Plaintiff lacked standing. Finally, 
triable issues remain with respect to time limitations creating a 
bar to Plaintiff's claims. 
For the reasons specified herein, it is respectfully 
requested that this Court reverse the ruling of the Trial Court 
and remand for further proceedings. 
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